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Let us put our minds together and see what kind of future we can
build for our children.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The right of self-determination is vitally important to indigenous peoples.
Self-determination is closely linked to cultural survival, economic development,
and the realization of other basic human rights. This right has gradually
achieved firm recognition in international law. At present, however, there is no
specific forum or process for resolving indigenous claims to self-determination.
Indeed, none of the instruments that reference the right to self-determination,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provide
specific remedies for addressing violations of this right. Moreover, there are no
definitive definitions regarding the contours of this right that could help guide
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the resolution of such claims. Thus, the focus of this paper is twofold: to
analyze some of the more difficult issues that a dispute resolution mechanism
might face in addressing indigenous claims to self-determination and to
articulate an optimal process or forum for resolving such claims.
Part II of the paper addresses the threshold issue of the meaning of the
phrase "indigenous self-determination." Much has been written on what the
right of self-determination encompasses and who is entitled to that right.'
National courts,2 human rights bodies,3 and states4 have similarly expressed their
views on the meaning and scope of this term. This section explores the meaning
of self-determination for indigenous peoples and the challenges that indigenous
peoples have faced in having their right to self-determination recognized.
Part Im of this paper analyzes the issue of development and control of lands
and resources by indigenous groups. While closely linked to Part I, this issue
merits a separate section because of its significant potential for derailing
attempts to resolve indigenous claims to self-determination. Yet it is a key
aspect of indigenous self-determination in that it is fundamental to the cultural,
physical, economic, and political survival of indigenous groups.
Part IV of this paper examines the self-determination experiences of some
indigenous groups in the Americas. The legal contours of self-determination are
continuously shaped by the realities of practice. Thus, examination of the
experiences of groups struggling for the realization of this right is an important
step in the creation of any effective dispute resolution mechanism. Within the
context of these cases, the section also analyzes some existing fora for
addressing indigenous human rights claims and analyzes how these fora might
be adapted to better address self-determination claims.
Part V summarizes my findings regarding the appropriate fora for resolving
indigenous claims to self-determination, as well as factors that may be crucial
to the resolution of such claims.
HI. UNDERSTANDING INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION
Before we can attempt to articulate a process for settling claims of self-
determination, we need to understand what that phrase might mean to those
asserting it. The circumstances, needs, and concerns of indigenous peoples are
1. See e.g., S. James Anaya, A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-
Determination, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & COMP. PROBS. 131 (1993); Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination Of
Peoples (1995); Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self- Determination (1990). See also The Right
to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, at 31 (1981) (Aureliu Cristescu, Special Rapporteaur).
2. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [ 1998] 37 LL.M. 1340.
3. See e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples (Art. 1): 13/03/84.
CCPR General Comment 12.
4. See infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
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as diverse as the communities that they embody. Yet, in the past several
decades, indigenous groups from around the world have come together in a
variety of forums to discuss and articulate a vision of indigenous self-
determination-what that phrase might mean to culturally distinct groups of
peoples and how it might play out in individual cases. While the scope of this
paper does not provide an opportunity to fully explore this effort, this section
highlights some key aspects of this movement, which should inform any process
designed to resolve future claims.
A. Indigenous Peoples
A major question that may arise in the context of resolving indigenous
claims to self-determination is how to define "indigenous peoples." While con-
troversy surrounds the use and application of the word "indigenous," some
common elements can be discerned both from scholarship as well as inter-
national, regional, and state practices: groups with distinct cultures, histories,
and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incor-
porated into a larger governing society. S. James Anaya in his book Indigenous
Peoples in International Law explains the relevance of these elements:
[T]he term indigenous refers broadly to the living descendants of
preinvasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Indige-
nous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive
groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the
forces of empire and conquest. The diverse surviving Indian
communities and nations of the Western Hemisphere, the Inuit and
Aleut of the Arctic, the Aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New
Zealand, the tribal peoples of Asia, and other such groups are among
those generally regarded as indigenous. They are indigenous because
their ancestral roots are imbedded in the lands in which they live, or
would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of more powerful
sectors of society living on the same lands or in close proximity.
Furthermore, they are peoples to the extent they comprise distinct
communities with a continuity of existence and identity that links
them to the communities, tribes, or nations of their ancestral past.5
The UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which will
be discussed shortly, emphasizes above all the importance of self-identification.6
The Chairperson-Rapporteur to the UN Working Group on Indigenous
Populations has similarly emphasized the importance of flexibility in defining
5. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1996).
6. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at art. 8, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994).
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the term "indigenous."7 Yet she also suggests some possible factors "relevant
to the understanding of the concept of 'indigenous:"'
a) Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a
specific territory;
b) The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which
may include the aspects of language, social organization,
religion and spiritual values, modes of-production, laws, and
institutions;
c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by
State authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and
d) An experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession,
exclusion, or discrimination, whether or not conditions persist.'
If a state accepts the "indigenousness" of a particular group, than this is not
a particularly difficult issue for any forum designed to resolve self-determina-
tion claims. However, a number of countries, particularly in Asia, have
consistently denied the existence of such groups within their borders. Therefore
this may well be a serious hurdle for some groups.
A tremendous amount of scholarship has also been devoted to the question
of who are "peoples" entitled to the right of self-determination. Few today can
dispute the notion that "peoples" include sub-national groups that are part of a
larger territorial sovereign unit.9 Just as international law has evolved from
being solely concerned with the rights and duties of sovereigns to include the
individual and collective rights of human beings, so too has self-determination
evolved into a legal precept benefiting "human beings as human beings and not
sovereign entities as such.""° Of course that doesn't address the more difficult
question of what groups constitute "peoples" for purposes of exercising a right
7. In her working paper on the concept of "indigenous people," Chairperson-Rapporteur Daes
states that "the concept of 'indigenous' is not capable of a precise, inclusive definition which can be applied
in the same manner to all regions of the world. However, greater agreement may be achieved with respect
to identifying the prinicipal factors which have distinguished 'indigenous peoples' from other groups in the
practice of the United Nation system and regional intergovernmental organizations." Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the
concept of "indigenous peoples," Comm. on Hum. Rts., Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, 14th Sess., UN Doc. ECN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (1996) [hereinafter Working
Paper Daes].
8. Working Paper Daes, supra note 7, at para. 69; Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigen-
ous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 57, 114-16
(1999).
9. See e.g., REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1373 (1998); Report
of the Human Rights Committeee, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992).
But see infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
10. See, ANAYA, supra note 5, at 76, 77-80.
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to self-determination. Factors commonly referenced, but by no means exclu-
sive, include: common racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural history;
some claim to territory or land; and a shared sense of political, economic, social,
and cultural goals. Indigenous groups often meet each criterion. Yet this
definition of peoples fails to fully contemplate the essence of the phrase
"indigenous peoples." Another factor often overlooked but nevertheless ger-
mane to addressing indigenous claims to self-determination is the role of
history. This historical undertaking requires both an inward examination that
allows Native peoples to reconstitute their own histories and identities and an
outward examination that acknowledges and addresses the wrongs that
accompany indigenous claims to self-determination.
B. Self-determination
Another key step in the resolution of indigenous claims to self-deter-
mination is to better define what is meant by the term "self-determination.""
While the term has often been equated with secession, we know that its meaning
11. The early origins of the concept of self-determination are well articulated: from the Marxist
precepts of class liberation, to the Wilsonian ideals of democracy and freedom, through its incorporation into
the United Nations Charter. The push for decolonization in the 1960s shed new light on the right of self-
determination, focusing on its humanistic components. By 1970, we see a shift in legal doctrine with the
inclusion of the right of self-determination in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations, which envisions both a collective right to fully participate in the political life of a nation
and some form of relief for those who are denied full participatory rights. See Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the
Charter of the U.N.G.A. Res. 2624, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 [hereinafter
Declaration on Friendly Relations] (1970). Within the international human rights movement, both the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights states that "all peoples have the right of self-determination." See International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (Annex to G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 490, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 LLM. 368 (1967); (G.A. Res.
2200,21 GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. AJ6316) (1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. This includes the right
to "freely determine their political status," to "freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development,
and to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources." Id. As the Canadian Supreme Court in its 1998
opinion on the secession of Quebec noted, "the existence of the right of the people to self-determination is
now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond 'con-
vention' and is considered a general principle of international law." See REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC, 2 Can. S.C.R. 217, at para. 111 (1998), citing e.g. A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A legal
reappraisal 171-72 (1995). Critics of group rights generally and the right of self-determination for sub-
national groups in particular highlight the potential for political instability and violence as a reason for oppos-
ing such a right. However, this focus tends to miss the mark. The claims exists; violence and instability can
be reduced by providing groups with peaceful and effective processes for addressing alleged violations.
Indeed, situations such as East Timor, Kosovo, Eritrea, and Chechnya may have taken a different less violent
course had international procedures and institutions been in place to address these claims early on.
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is much more nuanced than that, especially where indigenous peoples are
concerned. The UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is
a good place to start, since it reflects indigenous peoples' own stories and own
struggles for recognition of rights that are essential to their very survival. 2
The UN Draft Declaration embodies what is meant by the phrase "indigen-
ous self-determination," in that it specifies various freedoms, conditions, and
rights necessary for culturally distinct peoples to be fully in control of their own
destinies. 3 As Professor Anaya suggests, these rights, conditions, and freedoms
fall within several normative categories: non-discrimination, respect for cultural
integrity, control over lands and resources, social welfare and development, and
self-government." Adoption of the Draft Declaration by the General Assembly
12. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Declaration]. The U.N. Draft
Declaration is a document that is being considered by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights for eventual
consideration by the General Assembly. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text for more information.
13. The Draft Declaration includes an express recognition of the right of self-determination, but
doesn't stop there. It addresses a number of important collective rights, such as protection against genocide
and ethnocide, protection of socioeconomic rights, including the right to own, possess or use lands and natural
resources, as well as the right to autonomy or self-government. See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12,
at arts. 1-36.
14. See ANAYA, supra note 5, at 97-125. Critics who oppose indigenous self-determination might
contend that many of these norms are readily achievable irrespective of any recognition of a separate group
right. It is true that nondiscrimination, respect for culture, right to welfare and development, and protection
of property are already an integral part of conventional and individual human rights law. However, this
analysis fails to recognize the inextricable link between each of these norms and the norm of self-government,
as well as the collective nature of the right of self-determination. It is through the process of political
autonomy that indigenous peoples reclaim control of their land and natural resources, rebuild their social and
economic infrastructure, protect their way of life, and enhance their democratic participation in the larger
society. The U.N. Draft Declaration on Indigenous People Rights offers the clearest written articulation of this
interrelationship between the right of self-determination and other important human rights.
The preamble to the 1992 Indigenous Peoples Earth Charter illustrates further the meaning of indigenous self-
determination:
We the indigenous peoples walk to the future in the footprints of our ancestors.
From the smallest to the largest living being, from the four directions.
From the air, the land and the mountains, the creator has placed us, the indigenous
peoples upon our mother earth.
The footprints of our ancestors are permanently etched upon the lands our peoples.
We, the indigenous peoples maintain our inherent right to self-determination. We have
always had the right to decide our own forms of government, to use our own ways to
raise and educate our children, to our own cultural identity without interference.
We continue to maintain our rights as people despite centuries of deprivation,
assimilation, and genocide.
We maintain our inalienable rights to our lands and territories, to all our resources-
above and below--to our waters. We assert our ongoing responsibility to pass these
on to our future generations.
We cannot be removed from our lands. We, the indigenous peoples, are connected by
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would provide guidance to any process designed to resolve future claims. This
is no easy task, however, given the opposition to this document by some states,
particularly to the notion of self-determination. 5 The next section provides
further analysis of this opposition. By examining the current debates surround-
ing the draft declaration we can gain a clearer picture of the kinds of issues that
a dispute resolution forum will be faced with resolving. For instance, how does
secession relate to the right of self-determination, how does one bridge the
ideological divide between individual and group rights, and to whom and under
what circumstances does the right to development attach vis-A-vis the right to
self-determination?
C. Controversy Surrounding the Adoption of the UN Draft Declaration
In the past several decades, indigenous peoples have garnered international
support for their rights to live and develop as distinct communities. 6 Their
efforts have brought about significant changes in both conventional and custo-
mary international law. For instance, in 1982, the United Nations Economic
and Social Council, along with the United Nations Human Rights Commission
authorized the formation of a Working Group on Indigenous Populations, made
up of five experts from the Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities.1' The Working Group's original mandate was
the development of international standards concerning the rights of indigenous
populations. In 1993, a Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples was completed and subsequently adopted by the Sub-commission. That
same year, the General Assembly proclaimed the International Decade of the
World's Indigenous People. These two events are conceptually linked in that
adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly is a major goal of the
Decade.8
the circle of life to our lands and environments.
We, the indigenous peoples, walk to the future in the footprints of our ancestors.
15. See infra notes 26 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 5, at 45-58; see also Programme of Activities for the International
Decade of the World's Indigenous People (1995-2004) (para. 4), G.A.Res. 50/157 of Dec. 21, 1995, annex.,
Introduction, at http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu6/2/fs9.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
17. Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1982/19 (Mar. 10, 1982); E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, May 7, 1982, U.N.
ESCOR, 1982, Supp. No. 1, at 26, U.N. Doc E/1982/82 (1982), at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/
Huridoca.nsfTestFrame/691996bd9d67c914c 1256965004df3d3?Opendocument (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
18. In 1995, The Commission on Human Rights established an open-ended, inter-sessional working
group to consider the various provisions of the draft declaration. Upon completion of its work, the group will
send its draft to the Commission. If the Commission is satisfied, the draft will be approved by the Economic
and Social Council, which will in turn submit it to the Third Committee. Upon approval by the Third Com-
mittee, it will be submitted to the General Assembly for final adoption. The goal was to finish this work by
the end of the Decade in 2004, but for reasons discussed later in this paper this is not likely to occur.
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The Draft Declaration represents a monumental achievement for indigen-
ous peoples. As Professor Turpel notes:
First and foremost, it represents a remarkable feat of international
legal drafting by Indigenous peoples, human rights experts, and State
representatives. This kind of power-sharing of the pen is dramatic
because Indigenous peoples and their governments have been
virtually shut out of the institutions of the United Nations, relegated
to the status of 'individuals' or 'non-governmental organizations. " 9
In fulfilling its mandate to facilitate and encourage dialogue between
Governments and indigenous peoples, the working group reached out to large
numbers of indigenous nations and organizations-many of whom played a
pivotal role in the drafting of the declaration.2" For reasons more fully explored
in Part Il, this kind of participation by indigenous groups in the design and
implementation of any future dispute resolution mechanism cannot be
undervalued. As Professor Robert Williams' suggests "the Working Group's
Draft provides one important measure of the power of indigenous peoples' own
stories to transform legal thought and doctrine about the rights that matter most
to them."'"
As noted earlier, the draft declaration specifies important freedoms, condi-
tions, and rights necessary for distinct peoples to be fully in control of their own
destinies.22 Yet it is not a one sided agreement but rather represents-in the
19. M. E. Turpel, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples-Commentaries, 1 C.N.L.
R. 50 (1994).
20. The current working group on the draft declaration is similarly designed to provide for
significant participation by indigenous groups, even those lacking consultative status with the Economic and
Social Council.
21. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Frontier of Legal Thought III: Encounters on the Frontiers of Inter-
national Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE
LJ. 660, 683-84 (1990).
22. Part I of the U.N. Draft Declaration affirms the right of non-discrimination, full participation
in the life of the State, and self-determination generally. Article 3 of this part mirrors the language found in
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights that
indigenous peoples "have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Part II addresses collective
rights to live as distinct peoples, including protection against genocide and ethnocide. Part III protects the
cultural, spiritual, and linguistic identities of indigenous peoples. Part IV addresses education, labour, and
communication rights. Part V and VI focuses primarily on development and socioeconomic rights, including
the right to own, possess, or use indigenous lands and natural resources. Part VII focus on certain political
rights, including the right to determine citizenship and maintain institutional structures. Most notably Article
31 states that:
Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination,
have the right to autonomy or self-government, in matters relating to their internal and
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words of Chairperson-Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes-"a fair balance between
the aspirations of indigenous peoples and the legitimate concern of States.
23
Indigenous organizations and representatives have expressed support for the
declaration in its current form, with a willingness by many to consider changes
that strengthen and clarify the original text, are non-discriminatory, and are
consistent with international law.24 States involved in the working group
consultations have had varying views on the Draft Declaration. Some have
expressed a willingness to accept the declaration as it currently stands, including
Article 3.25 However, several prominent states have expressed strong opposition
to key aspects of the declaration. 6 By far the most controversial aspect of the
declaration is its use of the terms "peoples" and "self-determination."
For instance, the United States' position on the declaration has remained
fairly constant during the past eight years: indigenous peoples are not "peoples"
who are entitled to the full panoply of rights associated with the right of self-
determination. In its 1995 Statement on Article 3, the U.S. stated that "there
[are] no international practice[s] or international instruments that recognizes
indigenous groups as peoples in the sense of having the legal right of self-
determination. 27 In 1998 it articulated its objections in somewhat broader
terms contending that "no international practice or instrument recognizes sub-
local affairs, including culture, religion, education, information, media, health, housing,
employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resource management,
environment and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these
autonomous functions.
Finally, parts vIII and IX address implementation and interpretation of the declaration.
23. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: First Revised Text of the Draft Universal
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 3 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33 (1989).
24. See, e.g., Statements submitted by non-governmental organizations in consultative status with
the Economic and Social Council at Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Second Session, by International
Indian Treaty Council, E/C. 19/2003/NGO/l; Joint Statement to the 9th Intersessional Working Group on the
U.N. Draft Declaration for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at www.treatycouncil.org/
new-page_55211221212.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); 8th Intersessional Working Group on the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of the World's Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Tetuwan Oyate Teton Sioux
Nation Treaty Council, at www.tsntc.org/files/12_02_IWG.htm (last visited Feb. 11,2004) [hereinafter Report
of the Teton Sioux].
25. See Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights
resolution, 1995/32, E/CN.4/2003/92 (Jan. 6, 2003) (Chairperson-Rapporteur: Mr. Luis-Enrique Chavez)
[hereinafter Report of Working Group 2003]. See also Summary of the Informal Intersessional Consultations:
Geneva Sept. 16-19, 2002, at www.treatycouncil.org/new-page_-552.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004)
[hereinafter Informal Consultations 2002].
26. See id. See also Lorie M. Graham, Self-determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo:
Translating Self-determination "Into Practice" and "Into Peace," 6 ILSA J. OF INT'L & COMP. L 455, 462
(2000).
27. See id.
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national groups as having the legal right of self-determination"2 8 and further that
the United States has "concerns about adopting a declaration which suggests
that all indigenous groups have a right to be sovereign, independent states. 29
In the 2002 working group consultation, the United States shifted its position
somewhat arguing for the adoption of a right of "internal self-determination."3
However, the United States is not alone in its objections. Other Western
countries with significant indigenous populations have expressed similar con-
cerns. 31 In particular they cite concerns over what impact the full realization of
indigenous self-determination would have on the territorial integrity and
political unity of sovereign and independent states. This rhetoric is neither
surprising nor new. States have had a long history of arguing against self-deter-
mination claims on the basis of territorial sovereignty, and much scholarship has
been written on this issue. On closer examination, however, these objections by
states appear somewhat specious.32 Yet without a strategy for addressing these
fundamental objections no amount of process will help to resolve disputes over
the right to self-determination. Thus, the next two subsections as well as Part
II offers an analytical framework for addressing those objections.
1. The Right to Secession
Many of the states that oppose the use of the terms "peoples" and "self-
determination" do so on the grounds that it would signify some right to seces-
sion. The comments of the United States quoted above clearly signify this
concern. However, these comments suggest a fundamental misunderstanding
about the "substantive" and "remedial" aspects of indigenous self-determina-
tion,3 as well as a desire to apply different international standards where
indigenous peoples are concerned.
As suggested by Professor Anaya, substantive self-determination includes
the right to participate "in the creation of or change in institutions of govern-
ment" as well as the right "to make meaningful choices in matters touching
upon all spheres of life on a continuous basis" such as economic, cultural, and
social development.34 "The substance of the norm," however, "must be
distinguished from the remedial prescriptions that may follow from a violation
28. See id. After Kosovo, it is difficult for the U.S. to continue to make such a claim regarding sub-
national groups.
29. See id.
30. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25, at 21.
31. See Report of Working Group 2003, supra note 25; see also Informal Consultations 2002, supra
note 25.
32. See infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
33. See ANAYA, supra note 5, at 80-85.
34. id. at 81-82.
of the norm."35 Secession is only one possible remedy to a violation of the right
of self-determination and a limited one at that. Traditionally, secession was
seen as the primary remedy for undoing colonization. It has also been
considered an appropriate remedy in cases of alien occupation or subjugation.
The more recent trend has been to apply that remedy to denials of self-deter-
mination involving serious human rights violations. The Canadian Supreme
Court in its decision on the possibility of secession for Quebec summed up the
right of secession as follows:
[T]he international law right to self-determination only generates, at
best, a right to external self-determination in situations of former
colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example under foreign
military occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful
access to government to pursue their political, economic, social, and
cultural development.3
6
This interpretation is further supported by the United Nations' 1970 Declaration
on Friendly Relations, which suggests limitations on the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of a state when that state fails to conduct itself "in compliance with
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 7 Indeed,
during the December 2002 working group consultations, Norway proposed
amending the UN Draft Declaration to include an express reference to the 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations:
BEARING IN MIND that nothing in this Declaration may be used to
deny any peoples their right of self-determination, yet nothing in this
Declaration shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
State conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples.38
The Norway proposal merely reflects current law on the balance between
the remedy of secession for violations of the right of self-determination and the
protection of territorial integrity of existing states that meet their obligations of
a government representing the whole people. However, its incorporation in the
declaration is viewed by some as problematic in that it suggests a stagnation of
the right of self-determination that is not applicable to other peoples entitled to
35. Id. at 80.
36. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 37 LL.M. 1340.
37. See supra note 11.
38. See Report of Working Group 2003, supra note 25.
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the same right. Self-determination is a dynamic legal norm that is continuously
shaped by the realities of practice. Such changes should inure equally to the
benefit of all who are entitled to exercise that right.
39
Moreover, it is important to remember that indigenous self-determination
embodies something much more than a claim to secession; in its fullest sense,
it embodies the right of indigenous peoples to live and develop as culturally
distinct groups, in control of their own destinies and under conditions of
equality. If these rights are honored, secession becomes a moot point. Given
the limited legal and practical reach of the remedy of secession perhaps
something more fundamental is at issue here. Progress toward the adoption of
the draft declaration seems to be stalled, in part, as a result of some perceived
conflict between individual and group identities.
2. The Individual v. The Group
The 2002 working group consultation proceedings suggest an ongoing
struggle between the affirmation of individual rights and recognition of group
rights generally. While the draft declaration guarantees basic human rights of
all individuals, such as the right of non-discrimination, it covers much more
than that-at its core is the recognition of a set of collective rights that are
essential to the survival of indigenous peoples as peoples. A 1988 working
group report notes that "the harsh lessons of past history showed that recogni-
tion of individual rights alone would not suffice to uphold and guarantee the
continued dignity and distinctiveness of indigenous societies and cultures." 4
The UN Draft Declaration reflects this view. For instance, Article 7 provides
for protection against "ethnocide" and "cultural genocide," including any act
that that deprives indigenous peoples of "their integrity as distinct peoples."
Other articles recognize collective rights to land, culture, education, language,
and institutions of government. 41
However, it is because of its strong affirmation of group rights that I
believe the document is perhaps meeting so much resistance. It has fallen
victim to the longstanding ideological debate over whether group rights are a
proper subject matter of human rights. There are both philosophical and
political strands to this debate, which is centered on the liberal democratic
39. As of August of 2003, progress had not been made on the approval of the self-determination
articles. The 9th Intersessional Working Group on the UN Draft Declaration was to be held in the fall of 2003,
where further progress on the declaration may have been made.
40. See Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Sixth Session, U.N. ESCOR
CN.4, U.N. Doc. E/CN4/Sub.2/1988/ 24 at 21, para. 77 (1988). See generally Williams, supra note 21, at 685-
88.
41. See, e.g., U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at arts. 8, 12, 13, 14, 15,25,26,27,28,29,30,
31, 32.
principles of individual rights.42 In short, that we are all entitled to be treated
as individuals apart from our race, ancestry, ethnicity and so on, and that to
acknowledge group rights in their fullest sense is to create a political quagmire
that will lead to social and civil unrest. Of course the reality of the situation is
that collective rights are already very much a part of international law, from the
United Nations Charter to the International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights as well as Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. As Professor Thomas
Pogge argues group rights "are at the very heart our international order."43
Yet representatives from various states continue to deny the existence of
collective rights-a resistance which is reflected in the working group
proceedings. As of August 2003 only two of the forty five articles of the UN
Draft Declaration had been approved, both dealing with principles of individual
rights and equality: Articles 5 which states that "every indigenous individual
has the right to a nationality," and Article 43 which states that "All the rights
and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female
indigenous individuals."" Moreover, during the September 2002 informal
inter-sessional consultations some states expressed concern "over collective
(rather than individual) rights to land" articulated in Article 26 of the declara-
tion.45 Similar concerns were expressed regarding the "collective" intellectual
property rights articulated in Article 29.46 And while there seems to be a general
consensus that indigenous peoples "need to be protected from genocide or racial
hatred," several states continued the debate over "the issue of a collective
identity/rights v. individual identity/rights" when discussing Article 7 on the
right to be protected against ethnocide.47 One state went as far as to denounce
any claim to group rights, stressing that "human rights belonged to individuals."
Several others agreed "that the individual should be the focus and principle
beneficiary of human rights. 48 Contrast this with comments from an Indige-
nous Peoples Preparatory Meeting at the 1989 Working Group session that:
The concept of Indigenous peoples' collective rights is of paramount
importance. It is the establishment of rights of peoples as groups, and
not merely the recognition of individual rights, which is one of the
42. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1291 (1991); Robert Cullen, Human Rights Quandary, 71 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 79-88
(Winter 1992/93); Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential'" Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943,
974-76 (2002).
43. THOMAS W. POGGE, GROUP RIGHTS AND ETHNICITY, ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 187, 192-
93 (Will Kymlicka & Ian Shapiro eds., 1997).
44. See, e.g., U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at arts. 5, 43.
45. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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most important purposes of this Declaration. Without this, the
Declaration cannot adequately protect our most basic interests.49
Since self-determination is a collective right of peoples, the difficult
question for the resolution of future claims is how to close the ideological divide
between individual and group rights. A partial answer to that question lies with
a better understanding of what aspects of group rights states are concerned with
(beyond secession). The proceedings surrounding the Draft Declaration suggest
that states are particularly concerned with indigenous peoples' collective
exercise of development, of land and resource rights.
3. Development
For indigenous peoples the right to development, including control over
land and resources, is critical to their survival as distinct peoples. Yet the right
to development remains a major point of contention for many states. Given
both the complexity and importance of this issue to the future resolution of
indigenous claims to self-determination, it is dealt with in more depth in the
following section on the economics of self-determination.
IlI. THE ECONOMICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION
One reason why the issue of development may be so controversial is
because it is inextricably linked to the right of self-determination. For instance,
both human rights covenants link the right of self-determination to the right of
peoples to "pursue economic, social, and cultural development," to dispose of
their "natural wealth and resources," and to maintain their "own means of sub-
sistence. ' 50 Article 55 of the UN Charter similarly links the "right of self-
determination" with the promotion of "higher standards of living, full employ-
ment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.",5' This
linkage is an important one particularly where indigenous peoples are
concerned, and is best summed up in a recent UN study on lands and indigenous
peoples:
[A] number of elements.. . are unique to indigenous peoples:
i) a profound relationship exists between indigenous peoples and
their lands, territories, and resources;
49. Indigenous Peoples' Preparatory Meeting, Comments on the First Revised Text of the Draft
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (July 28, 1989), quoted in Williams, supra note 21, at 686.
50. See ICCPR, supra note 11, at art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 11, at art. 1.
51. See U.N. Charter, art. 55, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-chp9.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2004).
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ii) this relationship has various social, cultural, spiritual, economic,
and political dimensions and responsibilities;
iii) the collective dimension of this relationship is significant; and
iv) the inter-generational aspect of such a relationship is also
crucial to indigenous peoples' identity, survival, and cultural
viability. 2
For many indigenous nations, land is a major economic resource and in
some cases serves as the primary means of subsistence. Equally important to
the economic stability and growth of indigenous communities is the ability to
control other forms of property, such as cultural and intellectual property
rights.5 3 However, the right of development is not just a matter of economics,
but one of personal survival. Native peoples from around the world continue
to confront serious issues of poverty and its social consequences. As Professor
Anaya notes with respect to indigenous peoples worldwide, "the progressive
plundering of indigenous peoples' land and resources over time" along with
systemic "discrimination" have "impaired or devastated indigenous economies
and subsistence life, and left indigenous peoples among the poorest of the
poor."54 Control over economic resources provides a basis on which to reverse
these socio-economic trends.
There is also a strong connection between indigenous cultures and
socioeconomic rights. This connection is reflected in some recent UN human
rights decisions, such as Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, in which the Human
Rights Committee found that the cultural survival of Lubicon Lake Band of
Cree Indians was tied to its ability to control natural resource development on
its ancestral lands." Economic self-sufficiency provides indigenous peoples
with the freedom and ability to practice their cultures and to preserve and
enhance those cultures. Yet culture is more than just an end goal; it is itself a
"critical factor" in the development process in that it "informs and legitimizes
52. Indigenous People and Their Relationship to Land: Second Progress Report on the Working
Paper, Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur, U.N. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/18 (June 1999).
53. See, e.g. U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at art. 29; see also Study on the Protection of
the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous People, Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/Sub2/1993/28
(July 1993); Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People: Final Report of The Special Rapporteur, Erica-
Irene Daes, U.N. SUBCOMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (June 1995).
54. See ANAYA, supra note 5, at 108.
55. See Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/184 (Mar. 1990), at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/undocs/session45/167-1984.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004); U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990), at http://www.un.org/documents/galres/45/a45r040.htm (last visited Mar.
18, 2004). This case is explored more fully in part m of this paper.
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conceptions of self, of social and political organization, of how the world works,
and how the individual and group appropriately work in the world. 56
Economic self-sufficiency is similarly connected to political self-
determination. It is through the exercise of self-government that indigenous
peoples are able to maintain and strengthen the institutions upon which strong
economies are built. As one economist notes in relation to the experiences in
Latin America and Asia, "the key to economic growth is not Uust] resources, it's
institutions. It's things like stability in government, clear rules governing
contracts and effective institutions." Finally, you have an issue of participa-
tion-indigenous peoples seek to be actively engaged in any decision-making
process that affects their economic rights, especially natural resource develop-
ment decisions that are being made by states and third parties claiming rights
through a state.
The UN Draft Declaration encompasses many of these ideas on economic
control, protection, enhancement, and participation. The Preamble to the
Covenant recognizes "the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights
and characteristics of indigenous peoples, especially their rights to their lands,
territories, and resources, which derive from their political, economic and social
structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philoso-
phies." 7 It further notes "that control by indigenous peoples over developments
affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to
maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures, and traditions, and to
promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs. 58
While development rights are dealt with primarily in Articles 21-30, a number
of other articles touch upon those rights demonstrating their broad reach.
At the 2002 working group consultations, key development articles were
discussed and debated. While some states expressed support for these articles,
a number of states expressed reservations.59 Some purportedly went as far as to
suggest that the economic aspects of the right of self-determination may not
apply to indigenous peoples. 60 Others took a less draconian view, focusing on
the breadth of the articles and their impact on third party rights.6'
56. DUANE CHAMPANE, ECONOMIC CULTURE, INSTITUTIONAL ORDER, AND SUSTAINED MARKET
ENTERPRISE: COMPARISONS OF HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN INDIAN CASES, PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 245-46 (Terry L. Anderson ed. 1992).
57. See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at Annex 1.
58. id.
59. See generally Report of the Working Group 2003, supra note 25, at para. 27-49; see also
Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25.
60. See Report of The Teton Sioux, supra note 24, at 7.
61. Article 26 provides for the right of indigenous peoples to "own, develop, control, and use the
lands and territories, including the total environment of lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora, and fauna
and other resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used." Several states were
concerned that the language was "extremely broad and did not recognize the rights of other parties." Similar
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State resistance to indigenous peoples' rights to land and resources is not
limited to the UN Draft Declaration. Many current disputes between states and
indigenous groups center on this issue.62 For instance, the San Andres Accords,
which are negotiated peace accords between the Zapatistas and Mexican
government, are close to collapse because Congress chose to remove the
provisions that provide for local indigenous control of land and resources.63
Many of the cases that end up before international bodies deal with similar
issues. One example would be the recent decision by the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights involving the Awas Tingni of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, in
which the Court held that the Awas Tingni had the right to demarcation and
protection of their traditional and customary lands under the American
Convention on Human Rights. 6 Several other major cases involving the issue
of the economic rights are working their way through the Inter-American human
rights system---cases which could in theory change the legal landscape with
respect to the legitimacy of a state's resistance to international recognition of
indigenous rights to land and resources.65
However, this resistance may not be completely muted by judicial or quasi-
judicial decisions if we do not understand what lies at its core. Why are some
states so opposed to the notion of indigenous development when as a practical
matter it would help to alleviate the dire poverty that exists in many native com-
munities? A partial answer may lie in the fact that economics has historically
played a crucial role in the process of state-making (particularly control of
concerns were expressed regarding Article 25 on the recognition of the special relationship between
indigenous peoples and their lands, Article 27 restitutions of lands and resources, and Article 28 on the con-
servation, restoration and protection of lands and resources. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25,
at art. 26. In response to these claims, indigenous delegations noted that the articles are "appropriately drafted
in a broad manner so as to accommodate all the possible land and resource rights of indigenous peoples in the
different regions of the world." Report of the Teton Sioux, supra note 24, at 12. On third-party rights,
several states expressed concern over the interests of the non-indigenous parties that live on or have interests
in lands claims by indigenous peoples. Indigenous representatives noted in regard to third party rights that
some states were portraying "an incomplete and distorted picture of the historical and contemporary context
relating to indigenous peoples." Id. Finally on Article 29 dealing with intellectual property rights, some states
took issue with the collective aspects of those rights since such a right was not presently recognized in
domestic or international legal systems. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25, at art. 29.
62. See S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights
over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 33 (2001).
63. In Sept. of 2002, Mexico's Supreme Court upheld the revised Accords which deleted reference
to local control of lands and resources.
64. See The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Judgment of Aug. 31,2001, http://www.law.arizona.edu/Journals/AJICUAJICL2002/vol 19 .htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2004); see also, S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case ofAwas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New
Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002).
65. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 62.
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major economic exchanges within a defined territory) and thus may be viewed
by some states as a backdoor to eventual secession and independence.6 6 It also
may be that indigenous peoples' right to development is caught up in the debate
regarding possible linkages between human rights law and international
economic and trade law.67 Indigenous peoples' rights have been primarily the
province of international human rights law, whereas the right to development
has often taken shape within the contours of the policies of the Bretton Woods
system. This system led to the creation of a separate set of international bodies
and instruments, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, and more recently the World Trade
Organization. 6' Human rights advocates have spoken out against the threats that
globalization may pose to non-trade rights.69 Until perhaps more recently,
however, the law of trade and economics has remained separate from other non-
trade concerns such as human rights, labor, and the environment. 7' As
Professors Chinkin and Wright explain
[d]evelopment, as channeled through the financial, monetary, and
trading wings of the Bretton Woods system, had tended to entrench
and extend a Western free market economic model. This capitalist
model depends on growth and expansion, the proliferation and export
of First World technology, the gearing of developing economies to
servicing First World industrial needs, and the exploitation of Third
World economic and social structures."'"
Human rights, on the other hand, have often been invisible in this free market
system of rules and institutions.
However, in the UN Draft Declaration, indigenous peoples' rights to self-
determination are connected to development rights, which are in turn connected
to other important human rights, such as the right to be free from environmental
degradation, the right to a basic standard of living, the right to subsistence, and
66. See generally Diane Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Reponses to Ethno-
Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1988).
67. Cf. Sara Dillon, A Farewell to "Linkage": International Trade Law and Global Sustainability
Indicators, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 87 (2002); Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, The Hunger Trap: Women,
Food, and Self-Determination, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 262, 304-07 (1993).
68. Cf. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829 (1995).
69. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 273 (2002). See also JOSEPH E. STIGL1TZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Norton
2002).
70. See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 67.
71. See Chinkin & Wright supra note 67, at 306.
the right of equality, to name a few.72 These connections may be perceived by
some states as significantly impacting the larger debate over whether trade and
economic law should be linked to non-economic concerns. A related issue is
the impact that this linkage may have on multinational corporations doing
business with nation-states, particularly since the Draft Declaration requires
states to consult with indigenous peoples prior to commencing any development
project that affects their lands, territories, and resources.
Each of these concerns can be answered in turn. It is important to note that
the Draft Declaration is not a declaration of absolutes. In the words of Professor
Robert Williams, it does "delegitimate the five-hundred-year-old legacy of the
European doctrine of discovery" by recognizing indigenous peoples right to
occupy and control traditional lands and resources.73 Yet states also retain a
large measure of control over key economic resources.74 This does not mean
that states can ignore the concerns and rights of indigenous peoples with respect
to the development of those resources. States must protect indigenous peoples'
"total environment," seek their "free and informed consent," and provide them
with "just and fair compensation" prior to moving forward with any project
affecting indigenous lands and resources.75 In this way, we see a clear link
between the economic rights of the state and the human rights concerns of
indigenous peoples-linkages which are already occurring in other aspects of
international economic and trade law.
One example would be the World Bank's decision to adopt a "holistic
approach to development" that takes into consideration "the interdependence of
all elements of development-social, structural, human, governance, donors,
environmental, economic, and financial. 76 Beginning in 1982, the World Bank
issued its first policy directive on "Tribal People in Bank-financed Projects,"
which focused on protecting tribal land rights and health services. This policy
was strengthened in 1991 with the development of Operational Directive 4.20,
which was designed to promote "the rights of indigenous peoples to participate
in, and benefit from, [World Bank] development projects."77 These newer
72. See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12.
73. See Williams, supra note 21, at 691.
74. See id.; see also U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at art. 30.
75. Id.
76. See Richard Cameron Blake, The World Bank's Draft Comprehensive Development Framework
and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 159, 160 (2000), (citing
to World Bank Group, Comprehensive Development Framework, at http://www.worldbank.org/cdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2004)).
77. The World Bank & Indigenous Peoples, The World Bank Fact Sheet (Aug. 2002), at
http://lnweb I8.worldbank.org/ESSD/essdext.nsf/43ByDocName/TheWorldBankndigenousPeoples-
FactSheetl5lKBPDF/$FLE/IndigenousPeopleExtemalBriefWSSD2002.pdf. (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
Operational Directive 4.20 specifically requires that indigenous peoples have "a voice in projects that affect
them;" that "adverse impacts on indigenous peoples are avoided, or if not possible, minimized or mitigated;"
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policies and directives are more in line with conventional and emerging
customary law regarding indigenous rights to lands and natural resources, as
well as rights to self-determination.78
In sum, given the importance of development rights to the cultural, politi-
cal, and social survival of Native peoples it is unrealistic to believe that any
dispute resolution process will be able to adequately address indigenous claims
to self-determination if no strategy is in place to resolve these complementary
economic claims. While we may be tempted to try to separate these rights in the
way that they have been historically separated into economic/trade law and
human rights law, the trend in international law is to develop policies and
instruments that recognize their co-dependence. States who are negotiating or
addressing the self-determining rights of indigenous peoples should therefore
adopt similar approaches.
IV. EXPLORING MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING INDIGENOUS CLAIMS
Thus far the paper has attempted to better define what is meant by
indigenous self-determination, while at the same time identifying and analyzing
some of the major hurdles to resolving claims to self-determination, such as the
issue of control of land and resources and the right to development. This
section explores actual processes or mechanisms that may be used for resolving
such claims. It includes an analysis of some of the mechanisms already in use
by indigenous groups in their struggle for self-determination and then distills
from these experiences a list of factors that may be helpful to the resolution of
future of claims. The focus here is on the indigenous peoples of the western
and that "project benefits are tailored to the specific needs of indigenous peoples." This policy is undergoing
additional revisions to "ensure that the development process fosters full respect for the dignity, human rights,
and cultures of indigenous peoples." Id. The draft Operational Policies 4.10 strengthen earlier policies by
"providing clearer provisions for early and meaningful consultation and informed participation of affected
groups... adding new mandatory requirements regarding the commercial use of natural resources... on
lands owned, or customarily used by, indigenous groups . .. and adding new mandatory requirements
regarding the commercial use of cultural resources (including indigenous knowledge)." Id. See generally
Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself?. Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights and the
World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 527 (2002).
78. See, e.g., Anaya & Williams, supra note 62. For instance in its concluding observations to
Canada, the U.N. Hmn. Rts. Comm. noted the important link between indigenous peoples' rights to land and
resource allocation and the right to self-determination. See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 65th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 105 (1999).
In regard to the "aboriginal peoples" of Canada, the "Committee emphasize[d] that the right to self-
determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples must be able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources and that they may not be deprived of their own means of subsistence." Id. at para. 8. It further noted
that the "practice of extinguishing inherent aboriginal rights" to lands and resources was "incompatible" with
article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id.
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hemisphere, although many of the points are applicable to indigenous groups
elsewhere in the world.
While the draft declaration does not establish its own dispute resolution
mechanism, it does envision the establishment of "mutually acceptable and fair
procedures, such as negotiations, mediation, arbitration, national courts, and
international and regional human rights review and complaint mechanisms" for
the resolution of disputes with States.79 Many of these mechanisms are already
being used by indigenous groups in their struggle for self-determination, with
varying degrees of success. The following sections analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of some of the more readily used mechanisms.
A. UN Human Rights Committee
The Human Rights Committee has been the most active UN treaty-based
body to address indigenous people's claims to self-determination. The two
mechanisms in which this right has been explored are the state reporting
procedures of the ICCPR and the individual complaint procedures under the
Optional Protocol. Through its reporting procedures, the Committee has urged
a more comprehensive reporting of actions taken by states to implement Article
1 of the ICCPR as it applies to those nations' aboriginal peoples.8" This is an
important concession in terms of official recognition by a UN body that the
right applies to those groups. However merely requesting that a government
pay closer attention to the implementation of this right does little to ensure that
the right is actually honored. If a government chooses to ignore the recommen-
79. See Fact Sheet No. 9 (Rev. 1), The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Programme of Activities for
the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People (1995-2004) (at para. 4), G.A. Res. 50/157 of Dec.
21, 1995, annex., at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004); see also U.N.
Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at art. 39.
80. Like most UN human rights treaty regimes, the ICCPR requires state parties to submit periodic
reports on the measures taken to give effect to the rights recognized in the treaty. See ICCPR, supra note 11,
at art. 40. The Committee is then required to study the reports and offer comments to the state parties. In its
1984 general comment on the right to self-determination, the Committee noted in particular the persistent
failure of states to meet their reporting obligations under Article 1. See The Right of Self-Determination of
Peoples (Art. 1): 13/03/84, CCPR General comment 12, para. 3. The Committee stressed the need for states
to provide information on each paragraph in article 1, including information on the political, economic, social
and cultural aspects of the right of self-determination. Id. In recent concluding observations to reports sub-
mitted by Canada, Norway and Mexico, the U.N. Human Rights Committee emphasized the importance of
this concept as it applies to those nations' aboriginal peoples. See Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 65th Sess., at para. 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/Cn/9/
Add. 105 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Mexico, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 66th Sess., at para. 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CI79/Add.109 (1999); Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Norway, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 67th Sess., at paras. 10, 17, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 112 (1999).
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dations of the Committee, the reporting procedures of the ICCPR provide no
real means of enforcement.8 '
Thus, indigenous groups have turned to yet another ICCPR mechanism to
assert violations of that right-the complaint procedure adopted under the
Optional Protocol. This strategy has brought about mixed results. One example
would be the Lubicon Lake Band of Cree Indians case in which Canada was
accused of violating the First Nation's right to self-determination when it
allowed oil and gas exploration on the Band's aboriginal lands. 82 The Human
Rights Committee dismissed the self-determination claim, noting that the
optional protocol was designed to address complaints based on violations of
individual and not group rights.83 In the end, the Committee did allow the
submission under Article 27, the rights of persons, in community with others,
to enjoy their own culture---demonstrating an important link between cultural
integrity rights and the right to self-determination.8'
Yet similar to the Committee's reporting procedures, the enforcement
aspects of the Protocol are almost non-existent. In the Lubicon case, it's been
20 years since the Committee's decision against Canada and the dispute is still
ongoing. Thus, while the Human Rights Committee has been willing to identify
what amounts to self-determination violations (or more appropriately violations
of important norms associated with that right), it can offer very little in the way
of ensuring that this right will be ultimately realized.
B. Inter-American System
As an alternative, indigenous peoples have taken their claims to regional
bodies-such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court. Unlike the Human Rights Committee, the Commission
has demonstrated a willingness to entertain claims filed by indigenous groups
for violations of group rights. It has also shown a strong interest in mediating
disputes between indigenous groups and member states. However, much like
the Human Rights Committee, this system has built procedural and substantive
limitations.
For instance, in a case involving the Miskto Indians of the Atlantic Coast
of Nicaragua, the Commission refused to entertain a direct claim for a violation
of the right to self-determination, equating that right with decolonization
81. This is a criticism that is often voiced in relation to the human rights treaty system generally.
On the other hand, reporting under the UN human rights treaty regime does offer a quasi-public forum for
making the world aware of lack of compliance by a state. Yet the process offers no immediate relief to groups
being denied their right to self-determination.
82. See Lubicon Lake Band, supra note 55, at para. 2.1.
83. See id. at para. 13.3.
84. See id. at para. 13.4.
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procedures.85 In the end, the report actually supports indigenous self-determina-
tion, or the norms that surround indigenous self-determination, in that it called
for an institutional reordering of the Nicaraguan state to protect the group
integrity and development rights of the Miskto Indians. 86  The decision also
helped to bring about negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and
indigenous leaders. However, as the following discussion shows, another
shortcoming of the present system is the issue of compliance.
Since the Miskto case, the Inter-American Commission has received a
number of petitions that address key aspects of the right of self-determination.
One such case, The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v.
Nicaragua, also involved the Indians of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua. 87 The
Inter-American Commission expressed concern with Nicaragua's continued
failure to demarcate and protect Awas Tingni traditional land and resource
rights.88 Thus, the case proceeded, upon submission by the Commission, to the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights. The Court ruled in favor of the Awas
Tingni Community.89 It was a seminal decision in that the Court included
85. See Inter-American Comm. on Hum. Rts., Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment
of the Nicaraguan Population of Mikito Origin & Resolution on the Friendly Settlement Procedures Regard-
ing the Human Rights Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Mikito Origin, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.LIV/II.62, doc. 10, rev. 3 (1983), OEA/Serv.LIV/lI.62, doc. 26 (1984), at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
countryrep/Miskitoeng/toc.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Mikito Report]. See also ANAYA,
supra note 5, at 87-88. Clashes between the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic Coast and the Sandinista
government arose shortly after the government assumed power in 1979 and attempted to force the indigenous
communities to assimilate to the political and social objectives of Sandinista National Liberation Front. See
Mikito Report, Part I. Demands by the Indians of the Atlantic Coast for political autonomy and self-
determination were met with violent resistance by the government. The Indians sought relief before the Inter-
American Commission on Human rights (Inter-Am. C.H.R.), asserting, among other things, violations of their
inherent rights to traditional lands, political autonomy, and self-determination.
86. See Mikito Report, supra note 85, at Part Three, Conclusions and Recommendations.
87. See The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am C.H.R.,
Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, http://www.law.arizona.edu/Journals/AJIClUAJICL2002/col19 .htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2004). See also, Anaya & Grossman, supra note 64. In 1995, the Awas Tingni community had
submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission seeking assistance in the recognition of their rights
to lands that they had historically occupied and which were essential to their survival. The Nicaraguan
government had refused to demarcate Awas Tingni communal lands as required by domestic law and had in
fact offered logging concessions on parts of that land to a foreign company, leading the Awas Tingni to seek
relief before the Commission. The petition alleged, among other things, violations of the right to property
under the American Convention on Human Rights as well as violations of the right to cultural integrity under
article 27 of the ICCPR. See S. James Anaya, The Awas Tingni Petition to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights: Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and Governmental Neglect in Nicaragua, 9 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 157 (1996). See generally Li-ann Thio, Battling Balkanization: Regional Approaches Toward Minority
Protection Beyond Europe, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 409, 435-36 (2002).
88. Anaya & Grossman, supra note 64, at 8. See also Anaya, supra note 87.
89. See The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am C.H.R.,
Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, http://www.law.arizona.edu/Joumals/AJICI/AJICL2002/col19l.htm. (last visited
Feb. 18, 2004).
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communal property rights within the tenure of property protected under regional
human rights law. As noted in Section ll of this paper, a major stumbling
block to the resolution of indigenous self-determination claims centers around
assertions of rights to lands and resources. This case helps bring clarity to the
scope of those rights as they exist within the Inter-American human rights
regime.
With that said, states like the United States (who are not subject to the
Inter-American Court's jurisdiction) tend to ignore such decisions, despite their
importance in articulating general human rights obligations applicable to all
OAS member states. One recent example would be a case involving the
Western Shoshones of Nevada and two of its elders, Carrie and Mary Dann.90
The United States is ignoring a decision by the Commission that U.S. claims to
Western Shoshone lands are illegal under international law and that the United
States has used illegitimate means to assert ownership over those lands.9 Since
the Commission's decision is not legally binding (in the same way that a
decision from the Inter-American Court would be), it appears that the United
States will have the last say on what happens in this matter, leaving the
Shoshones with no further regional or international recourse. 92
90. Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
(2002), at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/casesnl5-02a.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Dann
Report].
91. The case has a long and complicated history. In short, the Western Shoshones maintain that they
have never relinquished aboriginal title to certain lands and resources and that the US is claiming rights to
those lands and resources as a result of a process that illegally discriminates against Native Americans,
denying the Dann sisters and other Shoshones basic due process rights as well as rights to property and non-
discrimination-key aspects of indigenous self-determination. After several years of review and com-
munications with the parties, the Commission ruled in favor of the Dann sisters. In order to come in
compliance with its human rights obligations, the Commission recommended that the United States (1)
provide the Danns and other Shoshone members with an equitable remedy for determining their land rights
(which may include adopting appropriate legislation or other such measures) and (2) review its laws,
procedures, and practices to ensure that the property rights of Indigenous persons are determined in
accordance with the rights established in the American Declaration. See Dann Report supra note 90.
Throughout the proceedings, the United States has denied not only the substantive claims but the
Commission's jurisdiction to hear such claims. The United States' defiance has been most evident in its
continued confiscation and sale of livestock that the Dann sisters were grazing on aboriginal lands and its
attempt to move forward on the distribution of funds for those lands based on what the Commission found
to be an illegitimate and discriminatory process. See, e.g., Report by Amnesty International on the Western
Shoshone case, at http://www.amnestyusa.orgljustearth/indigenous-people/westemshoshone.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2004).
92. The United States is not a party to the American Convention and has not accepted the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. Thus the decision of the Commission is non-binding. The
Commission could take additional measures such as attempting to verify compliance or holding additional
hearings, but the United States does not seem amendable to any services the Commission may have to offer
in resolving this dispute.
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It is worth noting that there are other ways in which alleged violations of
indigenous self-determination have been dealt with in the Inter-American
system. This includes country studies, on-site investigations, and even a
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The
Commission has the power to initiate country studies and, with the permission
of the state, on-site investigations relating to human rights violations. In the last
several years, the Commission has focused more closely on the indigenous
human rights issues in its country reports.93 This heightened attention has led
to increased awareness and in some cases the taking of positive steps by the
affected country in protecting the group rights of indigenous populations within
their borders.
The Commission has also prepared, at the request of the OAS General
Assembly, a Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.94 Similar to the UN draft declaration, the American declaration was
prepared in consultation with indigenous groups and OAS member states, and
is now under review by a working group established by the General Assembly.
Interestingly enough, the right to "self-determination" is not explicitly
mentioned in the draft American declaration. Perhaps this is intentional as a
means of avoiding the issues that have bogged down the U.N. Draft Declaration
process. The OAS Declaration has been criticized by some for the lack of
proper input by indigenous groups and because of concerns that it waters down
the rights articulated in the U.N. Draft Declaration.95 And it may well be true
that some of the provisions of the OAS Declaration in its current form are
weaker than its UN counterpart. At its core, however, it attempts to do much
of what the UN Declaration does with respect to recognizing and upholding the
various norms essential to realizing the right to indigenous self-determination.
For instance, Article XV mirrors in many respects the language found in the two
UN human rights covenants that "indigenous peoples have the right to freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
spiritual, and cultural development." 96
93. The Commission has reported on situations involving indigenous peoples in Guatemala,
Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil to name a few. See http://www.cidh.oas.org/publi.eng.htm
(last visited Mar. 17, 2004). The Commission's annual reports have similarly focused on the human rights
conditions of indigenous peoples throughout the Americas. See id.
94. See Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at http://www.cidh.oas
.org/ndigenous.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed Declaration].
95. Resolution regarding the Draft OAS American Declaration of Rights of the Indigenous Peoples,
at http://www.treatycouncil.org/section_211554.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) (International Indian Treaty
Council Resolution on the proposed declaration).
96. See Proposed Declaration, supra note 94. Cf. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of
Indigenous Peoples:A Global Comparative and International LegalAnalysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 57, 104-
07 (1999).
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In sum, the Inter-American system has been utilized by indigenous peoples
of the Americas to assert their rights to cultural integrity, land and resources,
non-discrimination, and greater political autonomy-all key norms associated
with the right of self-determination. Moreover, the General Assembly, the
Inter-American Commission, and the Inter-American Court have all shown a
willingness to extend a measure of group protection to indigenous peoples,
although there has been some reluctance to do so within the express framework
of the internationally prescribed right to self-determination. In addition, the
Commission has shown a strong interest in mediating disputes between
indigenous peoples and member states. Yet cases like the Western Shoshone
demonstrate the limits of the Inter-American system (at least as it is currently
structured) in providing lasting remedies to indigenous peoples. These limita-
tions have substantial consequences for indigenous peoples who are already
struggling to survive on the edges of society.
C. State Systems
This is not to say that all states are ignoring the important changes which
are occurring regionally and internationally. States throughout the Americas,
and the world for that matter, are well aware of the momentum that has been
created in the area of indigenous rights and international law and are responding
through their own systems of law, again with varying degrees of success. This
section will highlight some of those changes, from constitutional and legislative
reform to negotiated settlements. However, not all of these changes have led to
improved conditions for indigenous peoples, even within states that have taken
substantial steps to conform domestic law to international law and practice.
Thus this section will also explore some of the shortcomings implicit in any
process that leaves resolution of indigenous self-determination claims to states
without proper regional or international oversight.
In Latin America during the '80s and '90s many countries amended their
constitutions in ways that offered greater protection to the rights of indigenous
peoples.97 Of all the constitutional changes Colombia's is perhaps the most
comprehensive providing for the right of self-government within indigenous
territories, which includes among other things, the right to administer justice,
levy taxes, and regulate resources.98 This decentralized system of government
places control at the community level allowing for self-determination to take
hold in accordance with indigenous customs and traditions. With respect to
natural resource development by the state, the indigenous communities are
guaranteed the right of meaningful consultation and protection against further
97. See, e.g., Anaya & Willams, supra note 62 at 59-64; Wiessner, supra note 96, at 74-89.
98. CONSTrrUCION POLMCA arts. 246-47, 285-87 (Colon.).
derogation of their economic, social, and cultural integrity rights.9 9 It similarly
provides protection for the cultural identity and diversity of Colombia's
indigenous peoples, through such things as the recognition of Native languages
and control over education." Unfortunately, Colombia's civil war has pre-
vented indigenous peoples from realizing most of these rights.
Many other Latin American countries have taken constitutional steps to
protect the political, social, economic, and cultural rights of indigenous peoples,
each with a varying degree of success often tied to the larger political and
economic stability of the country. For instance, the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitu-
tion recognizes the collective rights of indigenous people to "maintain and
develop their spiritual, cultural, linguistic, social, political and economic tradi-
tions," including protection of their community lands from seizure or taxation.° 1
Like the Colombian constitution, the indigenous peoples of Ecuador have the
right to be consulted regarding non-renewable resource exploration and
exploitation and to benefit from those activities. They also retain certain rights
to renewable resources found on their lands and to the promotion of indigenous
"bio-diversity management, traditional forms of social organizations, and
collective intellectual property."'' 0 2 With respect to self-government, Article 224
provides for the establishment of indigenous territorial districts with the
eventual development of "autonomous [governing] entities."1"3 Yet political
unrest and economic degradation, particularly in Ecuador's Amazon region,
continue to threaten the cultural and economic traditions of Ecuador's
indigenous peoples. It similarly struggles with the issues of under-representa-
tion of indigenous groups in national and regional politics." 4
Nicaragua is yet another example of a country that has undergone major
legal reform that has yet to be realized in practice. The Nicaraguan Constitution
guarantees, among other things, the land and resource rights of indigenous
peoples based on their traditional and customary patterns of use and occu-
pancy.' 05 Legislation adopted in 1987 went even further, establishing autonom-
ous political regions for the indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast. 1
06
99. Id. at art. 330.
100. Id. at art. 246.
101. CONSTITUCION Ch. 5, art. 84 (Ecuador).
102. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 62, at 62.
103. CONSTITUCION art. 225 (Ecuador).
104. Inter-American Comm. on Hum. Rts., Report on the Situation in Ecuador, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.96,
Doc. 10 rev. 1, Apr. 24, 1997, at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/ecuador-englindex%20-%20ecuador
.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
105. CONSTITUTION POLrICA arts. 89, 180 (Nicar.).
106. See Autonomy Statute for the Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, Law No. 28, Chap.
2, arts. 6-9, at http://translate.google.conL/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.csd.gob.ni/autonomiaca
.htm&prev=/search%3Fq%3DEstatuto%2Bde%2Ba%2Bautonom%25C3%25ADa%2Bpara%2Ba%2Bre
gi%25C3%25B3n%2Bde%2Bla%2Bcosta%2Batl%25C3%25A1 ntica%2Bde%2BNicaragua%26hl%3Den
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However, the Awas Tingni case demonstrates Nicaragua's failure to implement
these constitutional and legislative changes, most notably in its refusal to
demarcate and protect indigenous lands and culture.
One place outside Latin America where constitutional reform has made a
difference in some cases is Canada.'t 7 A well-known example is the 1993
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement between the Inuit people and the Canadian
government. 10 8 The Premier of Nunavut has stated that prior to the passage of
%261r%3D%26ie%3DUTF-8%26oe%3DUTF-8 (last visited Mar. 18, 2004); see also CONSTITUCION
POLITICA art. 181 (Nicar.).
107. In the 1980's Canada underwent important constitutional reform, which included added protec-
tions for the rights of Canada's aboriginal peoples. See generally, Anaya & Williams, supra note 62, at 65;
Wiessner, supra note 96, at 66-71. The 1982 Constitution Act recognized and affirmed "The existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada." Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. n1
(Rights of Aboriginal Peoples of Canada), sec. 35(1). In addition, Section 25 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms recognized that the rights and freedoms articulated therein "shall not be construed as
to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal
people of Canada." While the Constitution does not expressly discuss indigenous self-government or political
self-determination, such rights are an inherent part of the aboriginal and treaty rights recognized under the
Constitution. Realization of aboriginal or treaty rights to lands and resources, to improved socio-economic
conditions, and to cultural survival is all inextricably linked to the ability of indigenous peoples to govern
themselves and to determine their own destiny in accordance with their traditions and cultures.
108. See Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen
in right of Canada, athttp://www.tunngavik.comlsite-eng/nlca/nlca.htm. (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). The story
of the Inuit people and their encounter with the Europeans is a familiar one. See Premier Paul Okalik,
Nunavut-North America's Newest Democracy, available at http://www.gov.nu.calNunavut/English/premier/
press/nand.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). Europeans began to arrive in what is now Nunavut in the 1600s,
looking for a passage to Asia. What they found were small nomadic villages that followed the migration
routes of the caribou and other animal herds. They were a self-governing people who managed their own
lands and resources according to their own laws and customs. And while encounter brought changes in their
lives, they held fast to their way of life until the early 1960s when the Canadian government decided to move
the Inuit from a land-based economy to a community-based one. It was then that most of the cultural upheaval
occurred, as the Inuit people were forced to adopt a foreign system of government and lost control over their
lands and resources. However, the 1970s brought about renewed activism and interest in indigenous rights
leading to a number of aboriginal groups being formed in Canada, particularly around the issue of land and
resources. In 1971 a national Inuit organization was formed to protect the interest and rights of the Inuit
people. This renewed interest in the protection of indigenous rights was aided by a number of important court
decisions, most notably Calder v. Attorney General for British Columbia, in which three of the seven judges
supported the claims of the Nisga'a people regarding their aboriginal ownership of lands. Although the
Nisga'a Indians technically lost the case, with three judges concluding that their rights hand been extinguished
and one dismissing on procedural grounds, it signaled a change in the Court's thinking on aboriginal rights.
This provided the impetus necessary to push the Canadian government toward negotiation of outstanding
aboriginal claims. It was during this time that the Inuit began to push for recognition both of their self-
governing rights and their rights to land and resources. In 1975, they presented a draft land claims agreement
to the Canadian government and open discussions regarding the establishment of a public government.
However, it wasn't until 1982, with the passage of the Constitution Act and Charter that things really began
to change for the Inuit people. As earlier noted, these constitutional changes offered a measure of legal
security for the Inuit people which allowed for them to move forward with settlement. In 1985, the federal
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the 1982 Canadian Constitutional Act there was "little incentive to negotiate and
sign a land claims when a subsequent government had the power to overturn
that agreement, if it so chose."1" The Land Claims Agreement provides for
"constitutionally-protected rights to land, money, renewable resources, and
social and political development."" 0  The Agreement also establishes an
arbitration board to resolve certain claims arising under the agreement. The
most well known aspect of the agreement, however, was the eventual establish-
ment of Nunavut, a new Canadian territory. The Inuit people chose to exercise
their right to self-determination through a public government structure. Yet
eighty-five percent of the population of Nunavut is Inuit and, not surprisingly,
Inuit worldviews have strongly influenced government operations and policies.
Other First Nations have negotiated agreements with Canada that similarly
provide for a measure of self-government and control over lands and resources.
Each accord varies, depending on the circumstances and needs of individual
nations. For instance, the Sechelt Indian Band in British Columbia chose a
municipal form of government under the Sechelt Self-Government Act,"' which
transfers certain local powers to the band as well as ownership rights to some
2500 acres of original reserve land. Other powers, such as police and court,
remain with the federal government. Another example would be the Nisga'a
Final Agreement,1 2 which establishes ownership and self-government rights to
some 1900 square kilometers of land in the lower Nass Valley of British
Columbia. This includes all subsurface and timber resources located on those
lands, as well as a host of other rights relating to wildlife and fisheries. In terms
of self-government, the agreement provides for the establishment of a central
government and four village governments and includes the right to police
themselves and establish their own court systems. Individuals who are not
Nisga'a citizens, but who lived on Nisga'a lands, have the right to be consulted
or participate in some capacity regarding decisions that affect their rights. Their
rights are similarly protected by the Canadian Constitution and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The above examples demonstrate that Canada has had some success in
addressing the self-determining right of aboriginal peoples through treaty-type
negotiations and agreements. This process has been greatly aided not only by
government announced its support for a new northern territory providing the last important component to the
realization of the Inuit peoples' right to self-determination.
109. Paul Okalik, Nunavut-North America's Newest Democracy, Dec. 3, 2001, at 4, available at
http://www.gov.nu.ca/Nunavut/English/premier/press/nand.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
110. Id.
111. Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, [1986, c. 27], available at Sechelt Indian Band Self-
Government Act, c. 27 (1986), available at http://www.canlii.org/ca/sta/s-6.6/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
112. See Nisga Final Agreement, at http:llwww.ainc-inac.gc.calpr/agr/nsgalnisgafb-e.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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the constitutionalization of indigenous rights but by the willingness of the
Supreme Court to begin to adapt Canadian law to contemporary human rights
law on indigenous peoples. Yet there are still a number of outstanding claims
in Canada, many of which are stalled as a result of an inability to reach
agreement regarding the control of natural resources and development. Lubicon
Lake, discussed earlier, is a perfect example."3 Situations like that of Lubicon
Lake, and even some of the cases in Latin America, would benefit tremendously
from the establishment of an international body that was empowered to mediate
claims that have failed to reach a negotiated settlement within a given period of
time. This proposal is discussed in more detail in the final section of this paper.
Similar issues arise in the context of the United States, which has officially
recognized and supported the policy of self-determination since the 1970s." 4
The United States has, in the past twenty years, negotiated new land and self-
government agreements with a number of indigenous nations." 5 Yet a major
shortcoming of these negotiated settlements is that US domestic law is so
lopsided in favor of federal "plenary power" that this may have precluded a fair
and balanced settlement with respect to the rights of certain tribes." 6 This is
especially true if the tribe was claming rights to lands rich in natural
113. See Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/184 (March 1990), U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990).
114. Since the early 1970s, the legislative and executive branches of the United States government
has recognized and supported a policy of self-determination for indigenous nations or Indian tribes located
within its exterior borders. However, this has not always been the case. Between 1778 and 1871 the United
States entered into some 800 treaties with Indian nations, about half of which were ratified by the Senate.
These treaties, at least in the eyes of Native nations, were considered solemn, government-to-government
exchanges designed to ensure the sovereign rights of tribes to their lands and territories. However, formal
treaty making with tribes ended in 1871 and with the push westward increased pressure was placed on Indian
nations to "assimilate" and adopt the ways of the dominant society. Perhaps the worst of the federal policies
during this time with respect to the self-determining rights of Indian nations was the allotment policy which
promoted the break up of communal land into individual parcels and the sale of so-called "excess" land to
non-Indians. 1934 ushered in a new era of self-government for tribes in the United States with the passage
of the Indian Reorganization Act. This law was designed to improve the deplorable economic conditions of
tribes and their citizens by supporting tribal self-government. However, by the 1940s we were seeing a
reversal of this support for tribal self-government toward policy of termination. It was during this time that
the Indian Claims Commission Act took effect, creating a special forum for the settlement of indigenous group
claims against the United States. While the ICC could have been a useful mechanism for bringing justice to
the indigenous peoples of the United States for violations of their aboriginal and treaty rights, it was from the
outset tainted by the policy of termination. The 1970s were a turning point in federal/Indian relations, with
the adoption of the policy of self-determination. This has been accomplished through a series of laws that
touch upon key aspects of the right to indigenous self-determination, such as education, Indian child welfare,
cultural rights, self-government, and economic development.
115. See, Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1778h (2003).
116. In addition, current federal practice does not always conform itself to either domestic or
international norms on the rights of indigenous peoples, as evidenced by the recent Inter-Commission decision
involving the Western Shoshone.
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resources."' Perhaps even more disturbing is the recent trend in the United
States Supreme Court to cut back on the self-determining rights of tribes within
their own sovereign borders."' Indian nations in the United States retain and
exercise a large degree of self-determination perhaps more so than any other
country where indigenous peoples reside. However, since these rights have
been subject to legislative and judicial abrogation, indigenous nations in the
United States are in a very precarious situation, always uncertain of what future
policies or decisions may bring their way. An international forum for exploring
and resolving indigenous claims to self-determination could be a valuable tool
for United States tribes, if for no other reason than it would help to level the
playing field somewhat." 9
D. United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
One such forum that might be able to assume that responsibility in the
future is the newly created United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues. 2 A discussion regarding the creation of this forum began at the Vienna
117. Compare Maine Indian Claims Settlement, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (2003) with Connecticut
Indian Land Claims Settlement, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760 (2003).
118. The United States Constitution denotes Indian tribes as one of three types of sovereigns that
Congress has the power to regulate commerce with, and while one might think that such constitutional
recognition would include the right not to interfere with the internal affairs of a tribe, the courts to date have
not read such a limitation into the United States commerce clause. Long ago the United States Supreme Court
proclaimed Indian nations to be "domestic dependent nations," whose powers are subject to the "plenary
power" of Congress. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). According to the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress has both the power to
abrogate treaties with Indian nations and pass laws that affect their internal rights and interests so long as those
laws are rationally related to Congress' unique trust obligation toward tribes. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974). Thus, unlike the situation that now exists in Canada, the rights of indigenous peoples
in the United States have never been constitutionalized, at least not to point where they are insulated from
legislative or judicial reform. Yet during the early years of the self-determination, the US Supreme Court
advanced a rather robust definition of tribal sovereignty. It reaffirmed their status as self-governing political
entities with distinct sovereign powers, such as the power to raise revenue, enact and enforce laws, remedy
disputes, and conduct government-to-government relations with the US and other domestic governmental
bodies. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164 (1973). The Court also recognized an important limit on the exercise of the federal govern-
ment's plenary power, stating that the power was "not absolute" but rather needed be judged against the
federal government's unique trust obligation toward Indian nations. See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm.
v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). Yet in the last few years the US Supreme Court has been moving in the
opposite direction providing less protection to tribes and actively engaging in what some have referred to as
"judicial termination." See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
119. The problem of course lies with getting countries like the United States to sign on to such a
process. As earlier noted, an important step would be to reach some agreement on the UN draft declaration,
particularly around the issue of what the right of self-determination entails for Native peoples.
120. For more information on the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, see
http://www.unhchr.ch/indigenous/ind-pfii.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004). Any process designed to resolve
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Conference on Human Rights and, after many years of consultation with
indigenous groups, was finally established by the Economic and Social Council
in 2002. The Forum provides advice and information to the Council on indigen-
ous issues relating to "economic and social development, culture, the environ-
ment, education, health and human rights.'' More specifically, it is empow-
ered to:
"provide expert advice and recommendations on indigenous
issues to the Council, as well as to programmes, funds and
agencies of the United Nations... [;]"
indigenous claims to self-determination should keep the following two things in mind: First, it is important
to create a space in which native peoples voices can be heard. Secondly, in formulating such a process it
would be valuable to look not just at existing western processes but also at indigenous processes involving
dispute resolution. Many state and international processes through procedural or evidentiary requirements
have excluded valuable information and suppressed indigenous voices. Yet resolution of indigenous claims
to self-determination cannot come about without taking into account both the historical realities and the goals
and aspirations of Native peoples. The processes of storytelling and listening cannot be undervalued as
means of collecting this information and creating pathways to justice. Recall, for instance, the case involving
the Western Shoshone and two of its tribal members, Carrie and Mary Dann before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. The case reached a regional human rights body because there was no
competent domestic forum in which the Shoshone and other Indian nations could articulate their own stories
regarding the historical and contemporary wrongs committed by the United States government. And it is not
only in domestic processes that this is akn issue. It has come up for instance in the context of discussions
regarding the UN Draft Declaration, in particular around Article 36 which deals with the recognition and
enforceability of Indian treaties and other related agreements. Article 36 provides for the enforceability of
treaties in accordance with "their original spirit and intent," which means looking beyond the text to other
relevant information that would help shed light on what the parties intended when they signed the agreement.
Some states have advocated for the removal of this language, despite objections from indigenous groups that
such a change might preclude indigenous knowledge such as oral history from being considered in the
interpretative process. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25. Cf. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1110. (Supreme Court of Canada overturned a lower court's ruling on the inadmissibility of
oral history to establish aboriginal land occupancy. The Court further noted that in relation to the disposition
of indigenous lands and resources there "is always a duty of consultation..." And in some cases this duty
"will be significantly deeper than mere consultation." It may "require the full consent of an aboriginal
nation."). This brings us to the second issue regarding the value of exploring indigenous processes to ensure
that the self-determination mechanisms provide the greatest opportunity for indigenous participation and input.
An extensive exploration of the key aspects of these processes may be helpful in ensuring meaningful
participation. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake such an examination, one ancient method
of dispute resolution that might be looked at is tribal peacemaking. While the process varies from nation to
nation depending on custom and culture, tribal peacemaking in general entails a "form of horizontal justice"
in which non-adversarial strategies are employed to bring about "conciliation and the restoration of peace and
harmony." See William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation,
and An American Indian Plea for Peace and Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 164 (2002); see also Phyllis
Bernard, Community and Conscience: the Dynamic Challenge of Lawyers' Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27
U. TOL. L. REV. 821 (1996).
121. See supra note 120, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, at http://www
.unhchr.ch/indigenous/indpfii.htm. (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
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" "raise awareness and promote the integration and coordination
of activities related to indigenous issues within the UN system
[;]" and
" "prepare and disseminate information on indigenous issues."
The Forum is made up of sixteen members, eight of whom are nominated
by governments and elected by ECOSOC, and eight of whom are appointed by
the President of ECOSOC following formal consultations with governments on
the basis of consultations with indigenous representatives. Each member serves
in his or her personal capacity as an independent expert for a term of three
years. One of the most positive attributes of the new forum is its level of
openness. For instance, when the Permanent Forum held its first annual session
in May of 2002, over 1000 indigenous representatives from around the world
were present. The 2003 session was attended by some 1,800 individuals from
500 different indigenous nations and organizations. Over seventy states and a
number of UN agencies including the World Bank also participated in the
session.
In 2003, the Forum did debate whether to make indigenous self-determina-
tion the focus of its 2004 annual session. Ultimately, the Forum tabled that
issue for another year, deciding instead to focus on the rights of indigenous
women. Given the Forum's reluctance to tackle the self-determination issue, the
question remains how useful it will be, or can be, in resolving these types of
claims. The fact that a permanent forum even exists in the UN is an important
first step. Not only does it create a mechanism for allowing indigenous peoples
to participate in formal decision-making at the UN, it also sends a message that
indigenous issues are matters of international (and not just domestic) impor-
tance. Additionally, the Forum's mandate appears broad enough to allow for
the development of future procedures designed to address issues that directly
affect the self-determining rights of indigenous peoples. Indeed, many of the
issues that the Forum is charged with addressing-economic and social
development, culture, the environment, education, health, and human rights-
encompass key aspects of indigenous self-determination. Yet it is too early in
the Forum's history to know exactly what particular functions or levels of
processes it will assume in relation to the realization of this right. The next
section offers some thoughts on what role the Forum might play in the future
resolution of these claims.'22
122. The Forum is not the only UN non-treaty based process available to indigenous peoples. Other
processes beyond the Permanent Forum include the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which
is charged both with standard-setting duties as well as the task of reviewing national developments regarding
the promotion and protection of indigenous peoples' rights. See Fact Sheet No. 9 (Rev. 1), The Rights of Indi-
genous Peoples, Introduction at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm. (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
Although the Working Group's mandate does not authorize it to examine specific complaints, some have
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V. SUMMARY
An abundance of activity around indigenous peoples' rights has unfolded
at the UN and elsewhere during the last 25 years, culminating in the creation of
a Permanent Forum. The question that remains then, is whether these processes
are sufficient to address disputes over indigenous self-determination or whether
something more can be done to help bring about the realization of the norms
associated with that right. None of the processes reviewed thus far are designed
specifically to hear claims of self-determination and many, like the Human
Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission, have foreclosed the
possibility of an indigenous group invoking that principle directly. Addi-
tionally, state constitutions or agreements generally do not reference the right.
Yet the norms that surround indigenous self-determination--control of lands
and resources, protection of culture, social and economic development, and
some form of autonomy or self-governance-have been the focal points of
many of the claims that have worked themselves through domestic, regional,
and international channels. Thus, self-determination, as a practical matter, has
been at the heart of most of these cases even if the term itself has been rarely
invoked.
In terms of the success of the various processes in resolving actual
disputes, there appears to be no single factor that is likely to bring about a
resolution. Yet the above cases do suggest some common factors that seem to
aid the process:
" increased activism and mobilization by indigenous groups;
• domestic constitutional (and judicial) reform that recognizes
and solidifies the rights of indigenous peoples;
suggested that "an informal complaint procedure has emerged de facto in the deliberations of the UN Working
Group." ANAYA, supra note 5, at 159. This is due in part to the openness of the Working Group's public
sessions, in which indigenous communities and organizations are allowed to speak freely and offer written
submissions for further consideration. Id. The Working Group also receives written material from govern-
ments, specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, and can conduct visits to individual
countries to gain to collect and disseminate information. In addition to the Working Group a number of
studies have been prepared for the Economic and Social Council on key issues affecting indigenous peoples,
such as the study on treaties and agreements with indigenous peoples and the study on the protection of the
heritage of indigenous peoples. See Fact Sheet No. 9 (Rev. 1), The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Introduction,
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). More recently a Special
Rapporteur was appointed by the Commission on Human Rights to study "the situation of the human rights
and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people." See ANAYA, supra note 5. The Special Rapporteur's
mandate includes, among other things, the power to receive information and communications on alleged indi-
genous human rights violations, to conduct fact-finding missions relating to those violations, and to formulate
recommendations on measures that can be taken to prevent and remedy those violations. Additional
complaint procedures that have been utilized by indigenous groups to address alleged violations of human
rights include ECOSOC Resolutions 1235 and 1503 procedures. See ANAYA, supra note 5, at 160-61.
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" a state's willingness to partake in meaningful dialogue, particu-
larly on such thorny issues as control of land and resources;
* and some type of quasi-judicial/mediation procedure to ensure
a proper balance of power among the parties, especially in the
area of follow-through.
Another consistent theme that seems to emerge in many of the cases
previously discussed is the usefulness of negotiated settlements. States seem
more amenable to such a process and, if done in a manner respectful of
indigenous views and objectives, it creates the space necessary to ensure that all
interested parties have a voice in the final agreement. Additionally, a negotia-
tion model seems better suited to address the many complexities that surround
indigenous claims to self-determination. However, many of the cases also
suggest that negotiated settlements without sustained regional or international
oversight may prove to be difficult.
This brings us back to the issue of the Permanent Forum and what role it
could play in the future resolution of indigenous claims to self-determination.
As currently formulated, the Forum has the power to provide "advice" and
"information" on indigenous issues. However, indigenous groups would be
better served by the creation of a formal mediation or even perhaps an
arbitration mechanism within the Forum itself. The body could be charged with
several functions, such as assisting with the drafting of bilateral agreements or
serving as formal mediator, particularly where bilateral talks have failed to bring
about a timely resolution. The difficulty, of course, lies with getting parties to
partake in such a forum. Perhaps they would be more amenable to such a
process, if it lacked binding authority as is the case with the UN Human Rights
Committee. Then again, such a body may suffer from the same deficiencies as
other UN human rights mechanisms. 123 In the beginning it would be helpful to
make the process voluntary and even non-binding until states and indigenous
nations are comfortable with the Forum's ability to resolve such claims in a fair
and objective manner. Ultimately, however, it may be useful to institute a
binding dispute resolution mechanism that steps in and resolves or helps to
resolve claims that have not been settled within a reasonable period of time.
The Forum would be empowered to issue binding decisions, including
articulating appropriate remedies for addressing both past and ongoing
violations of the right to self-determination.
In closing, the late Ingrid Washinawatok once wrote that the United
Nations is a place of talk and discussion, not necessarily a place of resolution.'24
123. Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms,
15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183 (2002).
124. Ingrid Washinawatok, International Emergence: Twenty Years at the UnitedNations, 14 NATIVE
AMERICAS 13 (1997).
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The struggle for indigenous peoples then is how to transform this system into
one that not only "talks about" justice, but also "dispenses" it. An international
self-determination forum that is designed to assist in the negotiation of claims
between indigenous peoples and nation-states would be a step in the right
direction. A structure for such a forum has already begun to unfold with the
creation of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Yet the scope of the
Forum's powers as it relates to the development of agreements between these
two parties will need to be clarified. In terms of the substantive rights that will
inform such a dialogue, many have already been articulated in various
international and regional human rights instruments and through state practices,
and can be further clarified and enhanced with the adoption of the UN Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
